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Abstract
The rapid growth in the number of online services leads to
an increasing number of different digital identities each user
needs to manage. As a result, many people feel overloaded
with credentials, which in turn negatively impacts their abil-
ity to manage them securely. Passwords are perhaps the
most common type of credential used today. To avoid the
tedious task of remembering difficult passwords, users often
behave less securely by using low entropy and weak pass-
words. Weak passwords and bad password habits represent
security threats to online services. Some solutions have been
developed to eliminate the need for users to create and man-
age passwords. A typical solution is based on giving the
user a hardware token that generates one-time-passwords,
i.e. passwords for single session or transaction usage. Un-
fortunately, most of these solutions do not satisfy scalability
and/or usability requirements, or they are simply insecure.
In this paper, we propose a scalable OTP solution using mo-
bile phones and based on trusted computing technology that
combines enhanced usability with strong security.
1 Introduction
Identity management is normally interpreted as the manage-
ment of users’ identities and credentials for accessing re-
sources. Identity management systems can thus be seen as
consisting of multiple functions related to authentication and
access control. For example, identities need to be registered
and deregistered. Credentials need to be securely distributed
to principals. Access authorizations need to be defined and
implemented on the system. During operation, principals
need to be authenticated, and the access control function
must grant or deny access to applications and resources re-
siding on a system or in a network, as a function of the previ-
ously defined authorizations. The authentication and access
control components are often tightly integrated.
Authentication is the process of verifying the correctness
of a claimed identity or origin. With online services there
are two types of authentications; user authentication and data
origin authentication. User authentication is the process of
validating the digital identity of an entity, e.g. when logging
in and starting a new session. It is a way of ensuring that
users are who they claim to be when they access systems.
Data origin authentication is to validate that the source of
data is as claimed. It is the verification that data has not been
tampered with in transit (data integrity) and that it originated
from the expected sender (authenticity).
In some online systems, data origin authentication is
important. Although the user has logged on from a spe-
cific client terminal and has been authenticated at the start
of a session, this in itself does not guarantee that every
data packet originating from the client terminal is the in-
tentional result of user actions. For example, a Trojan1
application could initiate online bank transactions from the
client terminal without the user’s consent or knowledge. The
Clampi virus is one such example which enables attackers
to remotely control victims’ computers to perform financial
transactions2. Data origin authentication can theoretically
eliminate this threat by authenticating the transaction request
itself.
The increasing number of digital identities that each user
holds will negatively impact the user’s ability to manage
them securely. This situation can be described by saying that
users suffer from identity overload and password fatigue [1].
The traditional requirements which dictate that pass-
words shall be difficult to guess and be different for different
services put a considerable mental burden on users. Various
studies [2] show that people use heuristic strategies to reduce
the mental load. Unfortunately, these strategies also make
passwords vulnerable to attack. A typical strategy consist of
reusing a small number of passwords for all the services a
user accesses. This means that the number of passwords is
constant while the number of services increases. To protect
the service with the highest risk, users often reserve a sin-
gle password for that service. Users tend to reuse the same
password, or variations of the same password for all low risk
services. This practice reflects that users will bypass or ig-
nore good security practice when faced with frustrating tasks
[3, 4, 5]. This represents a serious threat to the security of
user authentication, making systems vulnerable to all vari-
ants of password cracking attacks.
As a response to the growing threats to online services
security, special password management methods have been
developed. In addition, these methods enhance data origin
authentication by allowing the authentication process even
at the transaction level. User authentication alone is insuffi-
cient given the vulnerability of the standard client terminal
and the relatively high risk of some online services such as
bank transactions.
A typical method for data origin authentication is to use
an OTP (One-Time-Password). An OTP is 6 to 8 alphanu-
meric password that is used only once for user authentication
or for the user to authorize a transaction. This method ef-
fectively eliminates the need for users to create and manage
passwords and consequently reduces password cracking at-
tacks. Banks can implement this by issuing special hardware
tokens that can generate OTPs. The next section describes
OTP generators in some detail.
1A Trojan is a malicious software application that is not controlled by the owner of
the computer.
2Homeland Security Daily Open Source Infrastructure Report for 3 August 2009.
Available from: http://osd.gov.com/osd/200908 August/DHS Daily Report 2009-08-
03.pdf
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2 One Time Password (OTP) Tokens
There are two types of OTP generator tokens, hardware to-
kens and software tokens. An OTP hardware token is a dedi-
cated password generator device with an LCD screen which
displays a pseudo-random number consisting of 6 or more
alphanumeric characters (Studies showed that capacity of
short term human memory load is normally 7 +/- 2 items
[6]). Software tokens are OTP’s generating functions that
are stored on a general-purpose device such as a desktop PC,
laptop, PDA, or mobile phone.
Also, tokens can either be time based or event based.
With the time-based tokens, OTPs change at a specific time
interval such as every 30 or 60 seconds and requires some
sort of synchronization between the user’s token and the au-
thentication server. On the other hand, event based tokens
work on the principle that when one OTP has been used,
the next OTP in sequence is generated. The pseudo-random
number changes when clicking a button on the token. The
token device is synchronized with a peer OTP generator on
the service provider (referred to henceforth as ’SP’) side and
both tokens generate the same sequence of numbers. The
main weakness with time-based tokens is that they may be-
come unsynchronized. This requires the user to resynchro-
nize the token with the server by entering, for example, a
number of consecutive pass codes.
The simplest and most common tokens do not need any
connection to a computer and the OTP must be copied man-
ually from the token to the client terminal. In fact, this sepa-
ration gives this type of tokens its strength.
Tokens come in other forms as well. They can be smart
card or USB stick tokens that can be physically connected
to the client computer. Other types of tokens connect to the
client computer using wireless techniques, such as Bluetooth
tokens. Connected tokens have the advantage of transmitting
OTP automatically to the client computer. This feature can
enhance usability by removing the need for the user to man-
ually copy and submit the OTP.
Another type of physical tokens is the contactless token.
This category does not require a physical connection making
them more convenient than both connected and disconnected
tokens. Contactless tokens use RFID (Radio-frequency iden-
tification) to transmit authentication information.
In general, software tokens are considered to be weaker
than hardware tokens because of the unstable nature of soft-
ware compared to the security solid state framework of hard-
ware tokens, thereby making hardware tokens less vulnera-
ble to attacks; for example, with time-based software tokens,
valid future passwords can be generated by simply forward-
ing the clock on the platform where the software token is
installed.
The main disadvantage of hardware tokens is their us-
ability problem. With the increasing number of hardware
tokens needed by one user to be authenticated to different
SPs, the more inconvenient it becomes to manage all the dif-
ferent tokens. On the other hand, since software tokens are
installed in the devices where authentication is needed, this
will eliminate the need for carrying separate physical tokens
for each SP no matter how many tokens are required. This
will make software tokens more usable and will also make
them cheaper than hardware tokens.
Complex mathematical algorithm such as hash functions
are usually used to generate the series of OTPs. Each pass-
word is unpredictable, even when previous passwords are
known. With software tokens, OTPs are typically generated
using a shared secret key. In this manner, an administrator
will normally create and then submit a shared secret key to
each user. The shared secret key will then be seeded to the
software token to generate the series of OTPs.
In our opinion, the shared secret key should be under the
SP control and beyond the user control. Rather than other
entities such as applications, the user or owner of the to-
ken should not even have access to the shared secret key.
This is because users often are weakest link in the security
chain which is reflected by the relatively high success rate of
social engineering attacks to compromise security systems,
whereby the attacker manipulates the victim user to divulge
confidential information that can be used to defeat the sys-
tem’s security. Implementing this feature (i.e. SP controlling
the shared secret key) will enhance the security of shared se-
cret key tokens. Unless the shared secret key is known to
the attacker, such scheme will make a stolen software token
useless.
Mobile phone can be configured to work as security to-
kens. Mobile phone tokens can reduce costs and eliminate
the need for separate token device for each SP. In the next
section we will introduce Trusted Computing Technology
then, in the following sections, we will describe how to adopt
this new technology to develop a more secure shared secret
key tokens using mobile phones.
3 Trusted Computing (TC)
Trusted Computing (TC) is a general term used to describe
security systems that are based on secure hardware. The
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is standardized chip that
can provide support for TC. The purpose of the TPM stan-
dard, developed and promoted by the Trusted Computing
Group (TCG)3, is to support strong security functions in gen-
eral as well as Digital Rights Management (DRM) in partic-
ular. With TC, certain aspects of a computer’s behavior can
be enforced by hardware combined with software. TC func-
tions of the TPM are based on verifying that software hash
values (so-called measurements) are equal to predefined val-
ues, which in turn can be used to provide assurance of the
authenticity and integrity of software modules. The TPM is
currently integrated into and shipped with many hardware
platforms such as PCs and servers. This development is
mainly driven by business models for DRM. While the TPM
is rarely used in current systems, its relatively large penetra-
tion provides a basis for implementing identity management
solutions with strong security. Fig.1 shows an example of a
TPM chip.
Specific type’s behavior can be enforced using TPM
functionality. The TPM offers facilities for secure gener-
ation of cryptographic keys, and for controlling their use.
The usage of some cryptographic keys of the TPM is re-
stricted. For example, the owner of a computer is denied
from knowing or accessing these keys in general. The us-
age of the keys inside the TPM is controlled according to
policies specified in the TPM standard, and enforced by the
TPM chip. The TPM security requirements are defined and
evaluated according to the so called Common Criteria. The
TPM provides the kernel components of a subsystem used
to assure integrity, confidentiality and authenticity within a
Trusted Computing Platform. The TPM provides the follow-
ing functionality [7, 8]:
• Random number generator.
• Asymmetric key generation.
3TCG is an initiative led by IBM, Intel, Microsoft, AMD and others which
is used to be known as Trusted Computing Platform Alliance (TCPA). See:
http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org
76
Figure 1: A sample of an Infineon TPM chip
• Encryption/decryption.
• Generation/verification of digital signature.
• Hash algorithms.
• Identification and authentication mechanisms.
• Secure storage.
Every TPM comes with a unique key called the Endorse-
ment Key (EK) which is embedded in the TPM at the man-
ufacturing time [7]. The EK is an RSA pair key consist-
ing of a private key (EKpr) and a public key (EKpu) that
are 2048-bit RSA key each. The private key of the EK key
pair (EKpr) is stored within the TPM’s secure hardware
boundaries, is only used inside the TPM and cannot be ac-
cessed outside the TPM. The uniqueness of the EK pair rep-
resents the individuality of every TPM and the trusted plat-
form based on it and can be used to facilitate the encryption
of sensitive information in such a way that only the TPM can
decrypt it.
Upon activating the TPM a special 2048-bit RSA key is
generated and is guaranteed to always be present in the TPM.
This key is called the Storage Root Key (SRK) and is in fact
the root for all keys generated by the TPM [7].
Keys generated by the TPM can be either migratable or
non-migratable [7, 8]. Migratable keys can move from one
platform to another to provide the capability of more than
one system to use a key while non-migratable keys are used
when the private portion of the key needs to be guaranteed to
only exist in the TPM. Also, keys generated by the TPM can
be classified according to their usage [7, 8]. Storage keys are
used to store other keys or data. Binding keys can be used
to store symmetric keys and bind them to the TPM so they
can not be accessed outside the TPM. Identity keys or Attes-
tation Identity Keys (AIK) are used to sign other TPM keys.
Identity keys are also used to sign PCR4 values (representing
the software state of a platform). The AIK is an RSA 2048-
bit private/public key pair (AIKpr, AIKpu) used to identify
the TPM to a local or remote entity. An AIK pair can only be
used in strictly controlled ways, and only ever for generating
and verifying signatures. The main intended use for an AIK
is for attestation [7]. That is, the AIK private key (AIKpr)
can be used by a TPM to sign PCR values and the public
key (AIKpu) can hence be used for verifying signatures on
PCR values. More generally, an AIKpr can only be used for
signing values generated by the TPM itself and the AIKpu
is then used to verify these digital signatures.
4A PCR is a Platform Configuration Register in the TPM that stores a cumulatively
updated hash of the platform configuration values commonly known as measurements.
The TPM uses a number of certificates. The certifi-
cates are classified in a tree or hierarchical chain, which en-
sures that every certificate can be validated by its predeces-
sor [7, 9]. The validation process continues up to the root
certificate which is assumed to be known and trusted. This
arrangement allows external entities to authenticate the ori-
gins of a given certificate and track its ancestor certificates
in the hierarchy. The root or the starting point of this cer-
tificate tree is the TPM’s EK Certificate. The EK is loaded
to the TPM with a certificate from the TPM manufacturer
and/or the platform’s vendor (where it is embedded in) and
can prove to a secondary party that a key generated in the
TPM was generated in a genuine TPM [7].
The TPM manufacturer keeps an RSA key pair (MKpr,
MKpu) for that purpose. The private key part (MKpr) is
used to issue the Endorsement Certificate of the EK public
key (EKpu) of each TPM. Assuming that the manufacturer
and its public key are known, the existence of this certifi-
cate proves that the TPM is genuine and manufactured by a
trusted manufacturer according to the TCG specifications. A
TPM with an Endorsement Certificates that does not chain
to a known and trusted root should not be trusted.
The private key (MKpr) of the TPM manufacturer CA
key pair is stored in a highly secure environment at the man-
ufacturer’s site. It is only used to sign EK public key (EKpu)
after production while the public key (MKpu) of the manu-
facturer CA key pair is made publicly available to be used for
the verification of signed EK. As an example, the manufac-
turing certificate of Infineon (a market leader in TPM chips
and solutions) is published in the Infineon web page for the
purpose of verification of the Infineon TPM [10].
To add another level of trust and make the TPM internal
certificates more recognizable and trusted, the TPM root cer-
tificate (i.e. TPM’s EK certificate) can be digitally signed by
an external Trusted Third Party. For example, the Infineon
TPM EK Root certificate is chained to the Trusted Platform
Module Root Certificate Authority of VeriSign (the acknowl-
edged market leader in highly secure certificate technology)
[10]. This extended signature chain enhances security and
raises the level of trust of the entire TPM certificate chain
by relying the manufacturer root verification process to the
worldwide trusted infrastructure of VeriSign’s PKI, certifi-
cates and signatures in addition to the Infineon website. The
VeriSign certificate will be safely stored in the Infineon TPM
in addition to the already existed certificates [10]. This could
allow the owner of a TPM with an Infineon EK certificate to
perform path-validation for any given EK certificate from
Infineon.
Many industry players are planning to include TC in the
coming generation of devices such as mobile phones and
PDAs where TPM’s functions could be employed.5 The
TPM specification provides security services common to all
platforms and allows them to be implemented for specific
platforms. The TCG provided a security specification for a
trusted module similar to the TPM but is intended for mo-
bile phones. The Mobile Trusted Module (MTM) specifica-
tion [11] builds on the TPM security specification and trust
model. The MTM specification identifies multiple owners of
a mobile phone and defines two types of MTMs [11, 12]: the
Mobile Local-Owner Trusted Module (MLTM) and the Mo-
bile Remote-Owner Trusted Module (MRTM). The MTM
is used to refer to both MLTM and MRTM. The MTM
and TPM are compatible except for minor differences. The
MLTM is defined in terms of capabilities and commands that
5See the TCG Mobile Phone Work Group at:
http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/developers/mobile
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are defined in the TCG TPM specifications [11]. The MRTM
can provide similar services (but not necessarily all) as the
MLTM with extra functions to enable remote owners (e.g.
the phone vendor and the cellular network provider) to con-
trol services such as access to the IMEI6 and the cellular
network [11, 12]. More information about TC can be found
in [7, 13, 14]
Encryption is an important feature of trusted computing
technology. Data can be securely encrypted using binding
or sealing functionality provided by the TPM whereby data
is encrypted in such a way that it may be decrypted only
under TPM control. ”Binding” encrypts data using a TPM
generated non-migratable binding key while ”Sealing” en-
crypts data similar to binding, but specifies a state in which
the TPM should be in for the data to be unsealed (i.e. de-
crypted).
An RSA key pair can be generated by the MLTM to pro-
tect sensitive information. Information can be encrypted us-
ing the public key so only the MLTM installed in a mobile
phone (where the private key is stored) can decrypt it. Us-
ing this method, the clear text data can be read only to a
particular mobile phone application where the software hash
value is equal to a predefined hash value that is stored in the
MLTM. Attempts to read the data by any application other
than the predefined one will be refused by the MLTM. This
feature can be used to utilize mobile phones to work as se-
curity tokens. An application can be installed on the mobile
phone to perform similar functions normally provided by a
dedicated tokens. In the next sections we will describe an
enhanced solution that uses trusted computing technology to
configure the mobile phone as a multi OTP generator device.
4 OTP Token Using Trusted Computing
The basic idea of the OTP authentication scheme is that a
user device (such as an OTP token) uses a mechanism to au-
thenticate the user to the SP by sending the user’s credentials
and then connect to the SP’s server. The SP grants access to
its services by verifying the OTP credential. The user device
can be configured to facilitate the generation and manage-
ment of the OTP credentials. The user side and the SP side
can be configured to use the same function to generate the
exact series of OTPs. In this manner, as the two functions
at both sides are fed with the same inputs, both sides will
generate the same output.
Upon receiving the expected OTP from the user, the SP
can verify the authenticity of the user and may then grant
him access to its services. This is done by comparing the
OTP generated by the verification server on the SP side with
the OTP received from the user. For practical reasons, the
comparison is often done against a window of expected (and
unused) OTP values.
The security of the OTP authentication scheme is based
on the properties that 1) each OTP has high entropy, and 2)
each OTP can only be used once. This means that OTPs
can not be guessed in advance, and an intercepted OTP is
worthless to an attacker once it has been used. OTP schemes
can be used for user authentication or to authorize specific
transactions initiated by the user.
The SP verifies the OTPs sent by different users by keep-
ing a record of the algorithm and related parameters for each
user.
In typical implementations, the OTP function is actually
a hash-based algorithm that uses specific parameters such as
6International Mobile Equipment Identity is a number unique to every mobile
phone
a seed value, a key, a time value and/or a counter to generate
the OTP series.
The proposed solution suggests using a mobile phone as
a user device to authenticate the user to the SP. The phone is
equipped with an MLTM manufactured to satisfy the spec-
ifications of the Trusted Computing Group. The MLTM is
used as a secure processor to generate OTPs.
The MLTM can provide secure processing functionality
to generate the OTPs. Having this capability, the MLTM
can perform the OTP operations within its secure boundary.
Also, the MLTM cryptographic functionality can provide
physical protection of the sensitive parameters needed to
generate the OTPs. The parameters (e.g. shared secret key)
can be securely stored outside the boundary of the MLTM
in the external memory in such a way that it is only accessi-
ble under the control of the MLTM. In other words, the OTP
related parameters can be bound to the MLTM where only
the MLTM can unbind them. Giving this, when the MLTM
needs to generate an OTP, it will load the required bound
parameter data from memory, unbind it and then seeds it to
the OTP generation function (i.e. hash function) within its
secure boundary. The MLTM only outputs the data which
will be converted to OTP and does not release any OTP re-
lated parameters. This proposed solution will strengthen the
OTP scheme by taking the security level down to the hard-
ware and combining it with software to make the process of
generating OTPs highly secure.
In order to securely generate the same sequence of OTPs,
the MLTM and the SP should generate and maintain a shared
secret key to be fed to the OTP algorithms at both sides.
The OTP algorithm supported by the MLTM is actually
an HMAC (e.g., HMAC-SHA-1) function [7, 8]. In our
proposed solution, SHA-1 function uses the shared secret
key and a counter (for transaction-based method) or time
value (for time-based method) to generate the OTP. In the
transaction-based method, the MLTM and the SP increment
the counter every time they generate a new OTP while in the
time-based method the clocks in both sides should be syn-
chronized.
Finally, before the device can display the generated OTP
to a user, it needs to be truncated and converted to human
readable form.
4.1 Architecture Description
Assume that User-A has a business relationship with SP-i.
User-A needs to use his/her MLTM equipped mobile phone
as an OTP token. To implement this, a special middleware
application (referred to henceforth as ’OTP Generator’) can
be installed on the user mobile phone. The OTP Generator
consists of two parts: the OTP token configuration and OTP
generation. The first part is needed to initialize and config-
ure the OTP token by managing the secure exchange of the
shared secret key between the user’s mobile phone and SP-
i in addition to the secure storage of the shared secret key
on the mobile phone. The OTP generation part handles the
process of generating the OTPs. Both parts are explained in
more details below.
The key management part is processed only once at the
beginning when configuring the OTP token while the OTP
generation is executed every time a new OTP is needed.
A user can configure his/her mobile phone as a multi OTP
generator token by requesting the service from the SP. For
example, the user can call the SP or login to his/her account
with the SP to request the service (similar to the way of or-
dering physical OTP tokens currently used my some bank
customers), the SP may then send a CD containing the OTP
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Figure 2: OTP Token Configuration
Generator software to the user through the normal mail or
the user may download the application from the SP’s web-
site. The user then installs the OTP Generator on his/her
mobile phone.
4.1.1 OTP Token Configuration
The security of the proposed scheme rests on the trust estab-
lished between SP-i and the MLTM equipped mobile phone.
The trust will be assured if the shared secret key - which will
be seeded to the OTP function - is created, encrypted and
submitted to the intended mobile by SP-i in a way that guar-
antees that the key can not be tampered with, and will only
be used by the mobile’s MLTM of the intended user.
To establish a new shared secret key SKi-A, the steps
(indicated by numbered circles) illustrated in Fig.2 are re-
quired. The user first requests the shared secret key from SP-
i (step1), then uses the OTP Generator to instruct the MLTM
to generate a non-migratable binding key pair (Kpu-A,
Kpr-A) (e.g. using the command TPM CreateWrapKey)
and obtains the resulting public key (e.g. using the command
TPM GetPubKey) (step4). Steps 2 and 3 will be discussed
later.
The public key Kpu-A will be then sent to SP-i to use it
to encrypt SKi-A so only the MLTM, where Kpr-A exists,
can decrypt it. However, if Kpu-A alone is sent to SP-i there
is no way for SP-i to validate that it has indeed came from
the intended genuine MLTM. The mobile phone, where the
shared secret key is intended to be migrated to, must be first
identified to SP-i. The identification process involves two
parts:
I. validating that the MLTM which generated Kpu-A is
genuine.
II. verifying that the mobile phone, where the MLTM is
installed, belongs to the intended user (i.e. user-A).
The first identification part is the validation that the
MLTM which generated Kpu-A is genuine. To achieve this,
Kpu-A is sent to SP-i with the required certificate to validate
it. This is where Kpu-A is signed. The user could be re-
quired to obtain a hash of Kpu-A and then sign it (e.g. using
the command TPM CertifyKey) with an AIK. The signed
public key (Kpu-A) with its certificate can then be sent elec-
tronically to SP-i (part of step 5) which can verify that the
key has been generated by a genuine MLTM.
SP-i performs the validation, using the same certificate
path-validation process described in Sec.3, before sending
the shared secret key to the user. SP-i has access to the cer-
tificate associated with the MLTM’s identity key though a
third party certification authority. Consequently, SP-i can be
assured that Kpu-A belongs to a trusted MLTM and can then
send the shared secret key to it.
The second part is the authentication of the user in which
SP-i needs to know the identity of User-A who owns the
mobile phone where the specific MLTM is installed. That
will be achieved by the following tasks:
a. When receiving a request for a shared secret key, the
SP-i’s server will generate a nonce Na (step 2) and SP-
i will send it to the user’s mobile phone as an SMS
through the cellular network (an out-of-bound channel
(step 3).
b. The OTP Generator on the user mobile phone will then
generate a hash value of both the public key (Kpu-A)
and the received Na (i.e. public key and Na being the
input to the hash function) and then send the hash value
together with Kpu-A certificate to SP-i through the In-
ternet channel. (step 5)
c. Upon receiving the data, SP-i will authenticate the user
by generating a hash of Na and the received public key
(Kpu-A) and verifying that the generated hash value and
the received hash value are equal.
The cryptographic association between the common se-
cret Na (i.e. known only to the SP-i and User-A) and Kpu-A
enables SP-i to know the identity of the customer who sends
Kpu-A.
The Man-In-The-Middle attack will be avoided because
of the assumption that it is difficult for the attacker to obtain
Na. The Cellular network is used to exchange the value Na
and the hash function is irreversible which means that the
attacker can not get Na out of the hash value. The attack
is avoided because the attacker can not regenerate another
hash value of Na and his public key. This allows the user to
prove to SP-i his knowledge of the common secret (i.e. Na)
without revealing it.
Sending the hash value and the certificate (including pub-
lic key) to SP-i could be done, for example, by the user login
normally to his/her account with SP-i and then uploads the
data.
At SP-i side, Kpu-A will be subsequently used to asso-
ciate the shared secret key to the user mobile phone. Prac-
tically, this process is implemented by binding the shared
secret key to the MLTM of the user mobile phone by the
non-migratable binding public key Kpu-A. When SKi-A is
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bound by the public key (Kpu-A) to the MLTM of the user
mobile phone, only the private key (Kpr-A) which is pro-
tected by the MLTM of the mobile phone, can unbind it.
The encrypted shared secret key EKpu A(SKi-A) together
with an initial counter (Counti-A) value will be then sent
to the user’s mobile phone (step 7). Again, to avoid the
Man-In-The-Middle attack, a hash value ofEKpu A(SKi-A),
Counti-A and Na will be sent to the user.
At the user side, EKpu A(SKi-A) and Counti-A can
be stored in the mobile phone external memory. When
OTP generation is needed, the OTP Generator instructs the
MLTM to unbind the stored value EKpu A(SKi-A) to get the
shared secret key. The private key Kpr-A corresponding to
the public key Kpu-A that was used to encrypt the shared se-
cret key must first be loaded into the mobile phone’s MLTM
(e.g. using the command TPM LoadKey) and then de-
crypt the value EKpu A(SKi-A) (e.g. using the command
TPM Unbind). The decryption will be executed entirely on
board the MLTM and within its secure boundaries. The OTP
Generator is now ready for operation to generate OTPs.
The steps of Fig.2 are summarized in sequential order
below:
1. User-A, known by SP-i requests a shared secret key
SKi-A.
2. A nonce Na is generated by the SP-i’s server.
3. SP-i sends Na as an SMS to User-A.
4. The OTP Generator uses the MLTM to generate a non-
migratable binding RSA key pair (Kpu-A, Kpr-A).
5. The public key Kpu-A is certified by the MLTM under
an AIK. The OTP Generator sends the public key cer-
tificate (includingKpu-A) to the SP-i’s server. Also, the
OTP Generator generates a hash of Kpu-A and Na and
sends the hash value to the SP-i’s server.
6. The SP-i’s server:
(a) generates a hash value of Na and the received
Kpu-A,
(b) verifies that the received hash and the generated
hash are equal in order to authenticate the user,
(c) validates that the MLTM is genuine using the re-
ceived certificate and
(d) generates the shared secret key SKi-A.
7. The server sends SKi-A encrypted with Kpu-A,
Counti-A and a hash of both values and Na to the user
mobile phone.
8. The OTP Generator stores Counti-A and the value
EKpu A(SKi-A) in the mobile phone securely and uses
the MLTM to decrypt it when needed.
This procedure enhances the system security by creating
a root of trust where the SP (e.g. a bank) can ensure that
only the mobile phone of the intended user can access the
sensitive shared secret key.
The procedure described above can be repeated for an
arbitrary number of SPs. This turns the mobile phone into
a general purpose OTP generator token. The user will no
longer need to carry separate hardware tokens for different
SP. The OTP tokens can be virtualized and loaded into the
same hardware device.
4.1.2 OTP Generation
As discussed earlier, the OTP function we propose to use to
generate the OTPs is the SHA-1 function implemented by
the MLTM. Also, we introduced two main classes of OTP
generation methods. The first is the transaction-based where
a new password is generated every time the user sends an
OTP to SP-i. This method is based on a counter that requires
synchronization between User-A and SP-i. The second class
is the time-based where a new OTP is generated at specific
time or time intervals. This method also requires synchro-
nization of timing in the user side and SP-i side. The OTP
generation is based on multiple inputs. We suggest to use
the transaction-based method which uses a counter and the
shared secret key, as illustrated in Fig.3. This will provide
strong security against attempts to imitate the OTP function
by attackers.
Figure 3: Input parameters to the OTP generation function
For this to work, the key needed to unbind the shared
secret key (i.e. Kpr-A) must be first loaded to the MLTM.
The MLTM will then use the loaded key to unbind the
shared secret key to obtain SKi-A . SKi-A and other pa-
rameters will be fed to the SHA-1 function (e.g. using the
commands TPM-SHA1Start, TPM-SHA1Update and TPM-
SHA1Complete). The MLTM will output a 160-bit di-
gest. All these operations will be executes within the secure
boundaries of the MLTM. Finally, the OTP Generator appli-
cation will convert the resulting digest to a human readable
value (a.k.a. the OTP.)
If the OTPs run out of order, the OTP Generator can re-
quest a new Counti-A value from SP-i to resynchronize the
OTP generation.
Access to generating an OTP is secured by a PIN as usual
which could be the PIN used to access the mobile phone.
This will provide two-factor authentication, i.e. the claimant
user must control the device and know the PIN at the same
time.
When the user wants to replace the mobile phone, the
OTP Generator application must be installed in the new tele-
phone and then the procedure of Fig.2 must be repeated for
each SP.
5 Security Analysis
The proposed scheme combines the advantages of both the
physical and the software based OTP tokens. More specif-
ically, the scheme’s security is rooted in hardware, and it
allows OTP generation for multiple SPs while still only re-
quiring one single hardware device.
The scheme is aimed at enhancing the system security
by creating a root of trust where the SP (e.g. a bank) can
ensure that only the intended user’s hardware device, e.g.
mobile phone with MLTM, can access the sensitive shared
secret key. To gain SP trust, the scheme needs to satisfy two
conditions:
1. The shared secret key must be distributed securely.
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2. Every SP needs assurance that the shared secret key will
not be compromised and will only be used by the gen-
uine MLTM embedded in the intended user’s mobile
phone.
To achieve that, every SP should be able to validate the
MLTM’s source. The SP must be able to verify that the
MLTM is manufactured by a known and trusted manufac-
turer according to the TCG specifications, and to verify that
the validated MLTM indeed belongs to the intended user.
Standard key management and secret exchanging pro-
tocols like Diffie-Hellman and Needham-Schroeder are by
themselves unable to accomplish the above requirements.
The scheme needs not only to allow the SP and the user
to securely create and exchange the shared secret key, but
the scheme has to link the shared secret key physically to the
user’s mobile phone and establish an association between the
user identity and his/her mobile phone’s MLTM.
Binding the shared secret key to the private key which
is protected by the MLTM of the user’s mobile phone, and
performing the OTP calculation within the secure boundaries
of the MLTM in addition to securely distributing the shared
secret key between the involved entities makes it difficult
for attackers to compromise the shared secret key. If the
encrypted value of the shared secret key is intercepted and
read by an attacker (e.g. Man-In-the-Middle), it will be of no
value to the attacker unless he can obtain the private key to
decrypt it. The scheme also reduces the attack opportunities
to a negotiable risk level by distributing the shared secret
key securely using two separate channels. A brief security
analysis is outlined below.
The cost of compromising the shared secret key involves
the cost of compromising the private key or the cost of simul-
taneously controlling the two separate channels (i.e. Internet
and cellular network) to the same user. Once inside the mo-
bile phone, the shared secret key is protected by the MLTM,
and it is assumed that the MLTM is secure. It is also assumed
that it is difficult for an attacker to take over the control of the
user’s personal mobile phone and obtain the PIN to activate
it.
Controlling the two separate channels simultaneously
would be costly since it is assumed that it is difficult for at-
tackers to control the cellular network or the SMS messages
sent from the SP to the users while in transit through the mo-
bile network. Even if interception and cryptanalysis of SMS
messages sent over the air were possible, it requires that the
attacker is physically present in the same base station cov-
erage area, and this excludes attacks from anywhere in the
world. This added constraint of using the cellular network
which is separate from the Internet, where the public key is
to be sent, will increase the cost of any attempt to attack the
distribution of the shared secret key.
As an example, spoofing the user by the Man-in-the-
Middle attack will not only require the interception of the
Internet connection and replacing the public key of the user
by the public key of the attacker, but it would also require the
attacker to intercept the SMS sent from the SP to the user to
get the value Na and then generate a hash value of attacker’s
public key and Na.
As mentioned, the mobile phone should be protected by
a PIN and possibly also biometrics to prevent unauthorized
entities from accessing its content in cases where the mo-
bile phone is lost or stolen. In case a user fears that a stolen
phone could be compromised, the user should prevent unau-
thorized entities from using it to generate valid OTPs by re-
motely locking it. Remote locking is a service provided by
some mobile phone manufacturers and/or carriers to prevent
unauthorized access of lost mobile phones.7 The user must
also contact the SP to deactivate the OTP token. Deactivat-
ing the token will invalidate the OTPs generated by the lost
mobile phone and guarantee that it cannot be used for au-
thentication with that SP even if the locking service is not
available.
6 Limitations and Future Work
We assume that Na is a common secret between User-A and
SP-i at the time of OTP configuration because of the assump-
tions that:
• The SP knows the mobile phone number of User-A.
• User-A controls his mobile at the time of requesting the
shared secret key and receiving Na.
• There is no other mobile phone with the same phone
number.
• It is difficult for an attacker to control both the Internet
and the mobile network at the time of OTP configura-
tion.
However, the user can not be certain that Na is coming
from the SP. An attacker can intercept the request for shared
secret key from the user (Step 1 in Fig.2) and send a false
Na masquerading as the SP. It is possible for anyone to use
the SMS services provided on some Internet sited to send a
message to any mobile phone number and spoof any orig-
inating phone number. The attack could establish an OTP
scheme between the user and the attacker, but this would not
allow the attacker to masquerade as the user and gain access
to the SP’s services. The attack would normally be discov-
ered by the user when he is unable to generate valid OTPs
and consequentially becomes unable to execute transaction
requests.
According to the TCG standardization, the TPM (as well
as the MLM) only provides support for hashing data using
the SHA-1 algorithm. Although SHA-1 still can provide se-
cure hashes, it is considered marginal. Among the features
under consideration for the next generation of TPM, TCG
has indicated that SHA-1 is being phased out [15], which is
in practice means that it may be replaced by one of the SHA-
2 family hash algorithms, or by the future SHA-3. A stronger
Multi OTP solution can be deployed using one of the SHA-
2 family functions which can have hash blocks sizes of 224,
256, 384 or 512 bits if they are supported by the future TPM.
The separation of the mobile phone from the user client
terminal gives the OTP authentication scheme added security
strength. However, with the trend of malware attacks migrat-
ing from the Internet to mobile networks it would also be
possible for attackers to control the mobile phone and gain
access to the OTP Generator. In fact, a perfectly secure sys-
tem will never exist and there will always be weaknesses.
For example, attackers can get access to the mobile phone if
it is connected to the Internet or if the phone’s Bluetooth is
enabled i.e. making it available for a connection. The rel-
atively new attack known as snarfing, for example, allows
intruders to gain access to Bluetooth enabled phones by ex-
ploiting a security flaw in the wireless protocol [16].
Also, this separation limits the scheme’s usability, which
requires the user to manually copy the OTP from the mobile
phone to the client terminal. To enhance the scheme’s us-
ability, the process of copying the OTP can be automated by
7See: http://nokiae50.info/articles/protect-your-data-with-remote-lock
http://www.apple.com/iphone/how-to/index.html#basics.security-features
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securely connecting the mobile phone to the client terminal
without compromising the security strength. However, care
must be taken with this type of implementation, making sure
that the OTP Generator application and the shared secret key
on the mobile phone are protected from unauthorized access.
To date there are no mobile phones with MTM, so this
is not a solution that can be deployed quickly, however the
increasing level of risk related to identity theft when using
Internet services requires us to be well prepared.
7 Conclusion
The traditional requirements which dictate that passwords
shall be difficult to guess and be different for different ser-
vices put a considerable mental burden on users. Various
studies [2] show that people use heuristic strategies to re-
duce the mental load. Unfortunately, these strategies also
make passwords vulnerable to attack. This represents a se-
rious threat to the security of user authentication, making
systems vulnerable to all variants of password cracking at-
tacks.
As a response to the growing threats to online services
security, special password management methods that use
an OTP (One-Time-Password) have been developed. This
is implemented by issuing special tokens that can generate
OTPs. OTP tokens can be hardware tokens or software to-
kens.
A fundamental problem with introducing software mod-
ules for identity management such as software tokens on the
client platform is that its security relies on the inherent se-
curity of the platform. By storing shared secrets on the plat-
form, the risk caused by a compromised platform is ampli-
fied dramatically.
Although hardware tokens are considered to be stronger
than software tokens, however they have a usability prob-
lem. With the increasing number of hardware tokens needed
by one user to be authenticated to different SPs, the more
inconvenient it becomes to manage all the different tokens.
On the other hand software tokens can eliminate the need for
carrying separate physical tokens for each SP no matter how
many tokens are required.
The solution proposed in this paper involves the integra-
tion of hardware and software in order to assist users with
identity management. In particular, we have described a
solution where it is possible to install multiple virtual one-
time-password generators in a mobile phone that is equipped
with the hardware Mobile Trusted Module.
A situation where users are forced to have multiple physi-
cal OTP Generation devices results in usability problems and
does not scale. In general, since poor usability leads to poor
security, our approach which allows multiple OTP genera-
tors on a single device will improve security by improving
the usability and solving the scalability problem from the
user perspective.
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